The (a)Political Brain...

So I've been reading through Drew Westen's acclaimed book The Political Brain, and it's intriguing to say the least. Through incessant rambling about intensely detailed psychographics and clinical ruminations, Westen's thesis can be boiled down to this: people don't like to change their minds. In his years of testing, he's apparently deduced that the average Joe will doggedly--though perhaps unconsciously--cling to his biases no matter how much logical persuasion to the contrary is flung at him. Now, I began trudging through this work long before the 2008 election cycle (it's a mere 420 pages, excluding the glossary); despite the dryness and drudgery, I've lurched forward at an even clip out of sheer political intrigue.

Curiously, Westen persists in returning over and again to the 1998 impeachment of Bill Clinton as an example of the human penchant for personal political bias despite any apparent support for a contrary position. He cites the almost evenly divided partisan vote in favor of impeachment (which sided with the GOP majority at the time), with a very few defectors across the aisle. He suggests two things: first, that the members of the House reflected their constituents' political biases (which might stand to reason), and second, that even highly astute political players in an elected body are not immune to the dictates of unconscious bias. That, in a sort, their predisposition to vote Yea or Nay ruled the day despite a grueling and thoroughly executed case by the House Managers. The implications of such a conclusion are clear. That to effect change in politics, to win office, to do any sort of thing that requires mass public approbation, one must appeal to the more base senses of the average voters' emotional inclinations--that in point of fact, reason has little to no role in the public square.

But I'd like to posit an alternative theory here, evident both anecdotally in the least and perhaps logically at best. I've said for years that he who most effectively defines his terms and defends his assumptions will prevail in any debate. This is no more true than with Westen's argument. His underlying presumption in all of his conclusions--blind Darwinistic psycho-evolution excepted--is that there is a moral equivalence between the two prevailing ends in our American political spectrum, that in fact, no matter the debate, election, or issue, neither side is right or wrong. Further, Westen assumes an amoral political environment in which folks simply gravitate toward ideas that confirm their predispositions and away from those that deny them. I disagree.

Perhaps we have the cart before the horse. As my good friend and mentor, Dr. K. Alan Snyder, presciently pointed out his landmark book Mission: Impeachable, the GOP House Managers were guided in the case for impeachment by their undefiled pursuit of the truth, regardless of the outcome. Despite horrific criticism in the media, undeserved personal scrutiny, and even threats, they pressed on through what many would have abandoned out of shear self-preservation long before. In this of many examples, I must take issue with Westen's conclusions. On the contrary I propose the alternative: people with a less weighty anchor in moral absoluteness are more likely to be swayed by the warp and woof of the socio-political winds and media talking heads and less grounded by impartial, empirical certainty (this of course is the great of irony of Westen's "scientific" argument).

My proposition leads us to implications in the 2008 presidential elections. If Westen is right, then Obama's accession to the presidency was less a triumph of "hope, change, and destiny" and more a confirmation of a campaign apparatus's smartness in detecting the prevailing sentiments of the populace and exploiting them with a brilliantly crafted--and funded--show of light and splendor. But, if I'm right, then quite the opposite is true. It is demonstrable that, assuming a universal absoluteness and right versus wrong, the portion of the voting public less grounded in such absolutes are therefore more likely to gravitate to a feel-good message of next to no substance. On the contrary, voters that base their decisions on moral ground and therefore on reasoned conclusions more naturally gravitate to a message that makes sense and that confirms their conscious convictions.

Now, my friends on the other end of the spectrum will call me a moral hegemon. To which I will reply, "If the shoe fits..." But, they needn't take my word for it. In his much publicized poll, conducted by Zogby Int'l, John Ziegler commissioned exit surveys of a blind random sample of Obama voters. In it he asked them to attribute recent headlines and quotes to one of the presidential or vice-presidential candidates. The results, though not a surprise, were otherwise stunning in degree. Obama voters almost consistently confirmed media bias in favor of Obama and even misattributed negative public statements to McCain/Palin. On the other hand, Ziegler later conducted a similar survey of McCain voters and found quite opposite results. His conclusion: not that Obama voters are less intelligent than McCain voters, rather than less informed and morally-defunct voters were more likely to gravitate to Obama and vice versa.

Though I'll certainly finish Westen's book, it seems clear that his socio-political bias is confirmed first and foremost by the presumptions underlying his research. Self-fulfilling prophecy perhaps?